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NOTES
SPECIAL DECLARANT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
FOLLOWING MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ON
CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENTS
Condominium sales have slowed in recent years after experienc-
ing sustained growth in the 1960's and early 1970's.1 This decline
apparently has caused construction lenders to foreclose more fre-
quently on the mortgages of uncompleted condominium projects, 2
raising issues over the nature and extent of special declarant rights
and obligations.
A declarant is the creator, promoter, marketer, or developer of a
condominium project.3 The declarant records a master deed, or
declaration, identifying the rights and obligations of the declarant.4
"Declarant" also may include the original declarant's successors in
interest,5 who usually must perform the obligations of the original
declarant. If the successor in interest is a mortgagee or a secured
party, however, the successor may not incur the original declar-
ant's obligations unless the successor also has exercised special de-
clarant rights.8
The Uniform Condominium Act's definition of special declarant
rights "seeks to isolate those [ownership and development] rights
reserved for the benefit of a declarant which are unique to the de-
clarant and not shared in common with other unit owners."'7 These
rights allow the declarant to manage and control the condominium
1. See Teeley, Condominium Laws Under Scrutiny Following Foreclosures, Wash. Post,
July 10, 1982, at El, col. 1.
2. Id. See also Thomas, The New Uniform Condominium Act, 64 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1372
(1978).
3. Garfinkel, The Uniform Condominium Act, in CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS 153, 157
(1981).
4. 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PEOPERTY § 483.55 (3d ed. Supp. 1983).
5. R. GLAZER, PENNSYLVANIA CoNDoMmiIuM LAW AND PRAcTcE § 6.01 (1981).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 6.02.
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complex in a manner unavailable to the owner of any single unit.8
Special declarant rights are consistent with the declarant's role as
a promoter and developer of the entire complex who is interested
in full tenancy and in the improvements and management neces-
sary to reach that end.
As a consequence of exercising special declarant rights, the de-
clarant also incurs special obligations." These obligations, owed to
unit purchasers, include contractual duties and warranties of con-
struction and habitability arising from the declaration docu-
ments.10 Purchasers who bought condominium units before a fore-
closure, as well as subsequent purchasers, may be uncertain
whether the original developer or the foreclosing lender is responsi-
ble for special declarant obligations. The foreclosing lender faces
the similar problem of determining the declarant rights and obliga-
tions that it acquired upon foreclosure.
In the absence of definitive state statutes, the courts have strug-
gled to find satisfactory solutions to these problems. 1 State court
decisions, however, have not delineated consistently or clearly the
bounds of special declarant rights and obligations. 12 To resolve this
problem, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws drafted and approved section 3-104 of the Uniform
Condominium Act, entitled "Transfer of Special Declarant
Rights."1 " Six states have adopted section 3-104 as proposed or
8. Special declarant rights include:
[R]ights reserved for the benefit of a declarant to (i) complete improvements
indicated on plats and plans filed with the declaration; (ii) to exercise any de-
velopment right; (iii) to maintain sales offices, management offices, signs adver-
tising the condominium, and models; (iv) to use easements through the com-
mon elements for the purpose of making improvements within the
condominium or within real estate which may be added to the condominium;
(v) to make the condominium part of a larger condominium or a planned com-
munity; (vi) to make the condominium subject to a master association; (vii) or
to appoint or remove any officer of the association or any executive board
member during any period of declarant control.
UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 1-103(23), 7 U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1983) (cross-references omitted).
9. See id. comment 13. "[T]he concept of special declarant rights triggers the imposition
of obligations on those who possess the rights." Id.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
11. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 1372.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 69-94.
13. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-104.
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with slight modifications. 14 Michigan and Oregon have developed
alternative statutes which delegate the rights and obligations after
foreclosure.15 Most state legislatures, however, have ignored the
problem.
This Note will examine the Uniform Condominium Act's provi-
sions dealing with special declarant rights and obligations and the
measures that the various states have adopted. The Note will com-
pare the Uniform Condominium Act to the Michigan and Oregon
statutes and to judicial solutions in jurisdictions without a statute.
The Note concludes that some form of statutory delegation is nec-
essary to allocate equitably the loss that results from the original
declarant's default. Section 3-104 of the Uniform Condominium
Act is the preferable method for allocating those rights and obliga-
tions between innocent unit owners and innocent lenders.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONDOMINIUMS
The condominium concept16 of a horizontal and vertical division
of airspace as alienable property existed at least as early as the
Middle Ages1 7 and, some commentators argue, even in ancient
14. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1603-104 (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 515A.3-104 (West Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-7C-4 (Supp. 1982); 68 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3304 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); VA. CODE § 55-79.74:3 (Supp. 1983); W. VA.
CODE § 36B-3-104 (Supp. 1983).
15. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 559.235, 559.237 (Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 94.097, 94.103 (1981).
16. "Condominium" refers to more than one concept. Usually, the term identifies a form
of property ownership in which a person owns both an individual dwelling unit in a multi-
unit housing development and an undivided interest in the common elements. See J. Kus-
NET, HOW TO SET UP A NEW FIRST-HomE CONDOMINIUM 2 (Real Est. Rev. Portfolios No. 19,
1979); C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 451 (2d ed. 1971). The com-
mon elements include lobbies, grounds, electrical and mechanical equipment and systems,
swimming pools, and tennis courts. Proxmire, Introduction to Symposium on the Law of
Condominiums, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. xi (1974).
"Condominium" also may refer to the estate that an owner receives under the condomin-
ium form of ownership, consisting of a fee simple interest in the individual unit and an
undivided interest in the common elements. 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 4, § 483.52. Finally,
"condominium" may refer to a specific building within the development, or to the develop-
ment itself. Id. See Condominium Workshop, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 677, 716 (1974) (re-
marks of Mr. Parry).
17. 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 4, § 483.51. See also Garfinkel, supra note 3, at 155; Leyser,
The Ownership of Flats-A Comparative Study, 7 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 31, 33 (1958).
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Rome.'8 Although the condominium system of property ownership
has existed for some time, it did not gain wide acceptance until the
middle of this century when nations gave legal recognition to a
phenomenon that had become a growing practice among property
owners.'
9
Condominiums became popular in the United States after Con-
gress enacted section 234 of the National Housing Act (NHA) in
1961.20 The NHA facilitated the creation of condominiums by pro-
viding Federal Housing Administration insurance for condominium
mortgages if state law permitted condominium ownership."' Fol-
lowing the adoption of the NHA, individual states quickly enacted
condominium enabling statutes.22
Before the enactment of these statutes, condominiums were vir-
tually unknown in the United States.23 In the late 1960's and early
1970's, however, several factors contributed to the growth and pop-
ularity of condominium sales.24 Condominiums were less expensive
18. The existence of condominiums in ancient Rome is disputed. 2 H. TFFANY, supra
note 4, § 483.51. Some commentators have stated in absolute terms that condominiums
originated in ancient Rome. See, e.g., Garfinkel, supra note 3, at 155; Ramsey, Condomin-
ium, PRAc. LAW., Mar. 1963, at 21. Other commentators, however, doubt these assertions on
the grounds that "Roman Law followed the principle superficies solo cedit-whatever is
attached to the land forms part of it-and did not visualize separate ownership of floors in a
dwelling." Cribbet, Condominium-Home Ownership for Megalopolis?, 61 MIcH. L. REV.
1207, 1210 (1963). See also Leyser, supra note 17, at 33.
19. The first condominium legislation was article 664 of the Code Napoleon of 1804,
which divided responsibility for common areas-such as staircases-among property owners.
Leyser, supra note 17, at 33-34; Comment, A Comparison of United States and Foreign
Condominiums, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1011 (1974). The French enacted the first modern
condominium enabling statutes and regulations in 1938. Id. at 1012. Italy, Spain, and the
Netherlands quickly followed France's example by passing their own condominium laws,
and Germany, Austria, and Switzerland enacted condominium laws after World War II. Id.
During this period Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela also adopted condominium laws. Id.
Puerto Rico adopted condominium enabling laws in the 1950's that became the basis for
§ 234 of the National Housing Act in the United States. Id. at 1012-13.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1715y(d) (1976).
21. Proxmire, supra note 16, at xiv.
22. Id. All fifty states had adopted condominium laws by 1968. See 125 CONG. REc. 23,117
(1979) (statement of Rep. Rosenthal).
23. See Rohan & Berger, Foreword to Symposium on the Law of Condominiums, 48 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. ix (1974).
24. Proxmire, supra note 16, at xi; Rohan & Berger, supra note 23. The number of condo-
miniums in the United States grew from 85,000 in 1970 to 1,340,000 in 1975. 125 CONG. REC.
23,117 (1979) (statement of Rep. Rosenthal). Today, the number is estimated to be more
than 1,500,000. K. ROMNEY & B. ROMNEY, CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT GUIDE: PROCEDURE,
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to purchase2 5 and required less maintenance than traditional de-
tached single-family dwellings, 26 yet they offered the same tax ben-
efits as home ownership.27 The desire of homeowners to be close to
cities, and the scarcity of land in urban areas28 also encouraged the
use of multifamily housing. Additionally, home buyers often sought
property that included recreational facilities. 29 Finally, the home-
buying market changed because single, divorced, childless, elderly,
and geographically mobile consumers entered the home-buying
market and found that condominiums met their special housing
needs.30 The condominium sales boom caused some observers to
predict that condominiums would become the most popular form
of housing in the United States.3 1
In the late 1970's, however, condominium developers began to
have difficulty selling units in their planned projects. A stagnant
economy and high interest rates reduced the number of potential
home buyers.2 Although completed condominium units and
projects were readily available in the housing market, the rate of
sales did not match the rate of development.33 Developers were un-
ANALYSIS, FORMS 1.01[3] (rev. ed. 1983). For a more detailed discussion of the reasons for
the increased popularity of condominiums, see id. at % 1.0113], 1.0114], 1.04(3], 3.04.
25. See 125 CONG. REC. 23,117 (1979) (statement of Rep. Rosenthal); Garrigan, Multifam-
ily Properties: An Attractive Investment for the 1980s, REAL EST. REV., Summer 1982, at
103, 109; Proxmire, supra note 16, at xi-xii; Rohan & Berger, supra note 23, at ix.
26. 125 CONG. REc. 23,117 (1979) (statement of Rep. Rosenthal); Proxmire, supra note 16,
at xii.
27. 125 CONG. REC. 23,117 (1979) (statement of Rep. Rosenthal).
28. See id.; Rohan & Berger, supra note 23, at ix.
29. Proxmire, supra note 16, at xii.
30. Id. See also Rohan & Berger, supra note 23, at ix.
31. See 125 CONG. REC. 23,117 (1979) (statement of Rep. Rosenthal); Rohan & Berger,
supra note 23, at ix.
32. See Teeley, supra note 1. In the early 1970's, when interest rates remained between
7% and 9%, consumers were willing to enter the housing market. When interest rates rose
to 15% or more in the late 1970's, however, "[w]ould-be home buyers were largely frozen
out of the housing market." Garrigan, supra note 25, at 109.
33. See generally Teeley, supra note 1. This phenomenon affected not only the condo-
minium market, but the entire housing market. One commentator noted:
There is no shortage of housing today. There are currently over 300,000 new
single-family homes, 80,000 new condos, and 90,000 converted condos in stand-
ing inventory across the country. Add to that the thousands of existing housing
units which are listed for sale, and it is obvious that there is no shortage of
housing. There is plenty to buy, and there are still some builders to supply
more.
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able to satisfy their mortgage obligations or to complete the devel-
opment of projects.3 4 As a result, lenders who had made construc-
tion loans to the condominium developers foreclosed on the
developments to satisfy the developers' debts.3 5 This scenario will
continue as long as the condominium market falters and develop-
ers are unable to sell units.
SPECIAL DECLARANT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
A developer who sells units in a partially or fully completed con-
dominium project is exposed to a broad range of potential liability
to the individual owners.38 The developer may be liable to owners
for deficiencies in the construction of common elements," such as
parking lots and recreational facilities, or for deviations from con-
struction specifications contained in the condominium declaration
documents.3 8 The developer also may be liable for negligence in
the design or construction of the condominium, for breach of ex-
press or implied warranties of construction and habitability with
respect to individual units,39 or for breach of promise relating to
the development of the entire project or the use of land within the
project.40 Finally, fraud and misrepresentation during the sale of
units are additional sources of liability.41
The condominium unit owner confronted with any of these
problems is likely to seek redress in the courts. If the developer has
continued to exercise special declarant rights, he remains liable to
the unit owners.42 A problem arises, however, if the developer is
Lesser, The Future of Housing Depends on Adaptable Builders, REAL EST. REV., Summer
1982, at 112, 115.
34. Teeley, supra note 1.
35. Id. See also Thomas, supra note 2, at 1372.
36. See generally M. LEviNE, REALTORS' LLAmLrrY (1979); Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of
Liability in the Development and Administration of Condominium and Home Owner As-
sociations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (1976); Comment, Products Liability and the Sale
of a New Dwelling, 17 GONz. L. REv. 39 (1981).
37. See Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 36, at 951.
38. Id. at 953-54.
39. See generally id. at 954-62.
40. See generally id. at 963-70.
41. See generally id. at 970-72.
42. See generally id. at 953. Neither the Uniform Condominium Act nor the state stat-
utes relieve a condominium developer of liability for its own wrongdoing. Moreover, the
developer will be liable if it has retained any special declarant right. See UNIF. CONDOMIN-
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insolvent and the mortgagee has foreclosed on the project. The
owner may be unsure whether to sue the developer, the mortgagee,
or both.
Because the defaulting developer is likely to be judgment-proof,
the unit owner often must turn to the lender as the potential
source of recovery.'3 Complications can arise, however, when the
unit owner sues the lender. The expectations of the innocent pur-
chaser conflict with the financial considerations of the lender. Both
the unit owners and the lender have legitimate claims to legal pro-
tection. The courts seek to protect the owner's contractual rights
and the value of his investment in the property."4 The courts also
attempt to protect lenders to ensure the continued availability of
condominium construction loans. If the declarant's liability is im-
posed on lenders, condominium construction loans at affordable in-
terest rates may become unavailable. The lenders would face the
uncomfortable dilemma of either absorbing a substantial loss by
not foreclosing on an insolvent developer or assuming significant
potential liability to unit owners by foreclosing.45 Courts and legis-
latures have adopted varying approaches to resolve this dilemma.
The Great Western Rule
In addressing the imposition of liability in the condominium
mortgage foreclosure situation, many commentators and courts
have focused on the Great Western rule, although the rule
emerged in a setting that did not involve condominiums. In Con-
nor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association,6 the California
IUM AcT § 3-104(b)(1), (3); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 559.237 (Supp. 1982); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 94.097(2)(a), (b) (1981).
43. Builders and developers typically operate on the brink of insolvency. The industry is
comprised of "thousands of small, undercapitalized firms which can easily enter and depart
from the industry in accordance with fluctuations in housing demand." Comment, Liability
of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 739,
740-41 (1968). Often, builders "obtain almost total financing from lending institutions" for
planned projects. Id. at 741. Because builders seldom have any assets against which to en-
force a judgment, disappointed owners view the construction lender as the only source of
recoverable funds. Id.
44. Cf. Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850,., 447 P.2d 609, 618-19,
73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378-79 (1968) ("the losses of family savings invested in seriously defective
homes would be devastating economic blows if no redress were available").
45. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
46. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
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Supreme Court imposed liability on Great Western, the construc-
tion lender of a development consisting of detached single-family
dwellings.47 The lender loaned purchase money and construction
money to the developer, and obtained a right of first refusal to
make purchase loans to buyers in the development.4 ' Additionally,
the developer paid loan fees to the lender regardless of whether
buyers borrowed from the lender. 49 The lender required the devel-
oper to submit construction plans, specifications, and work and
cost breakdowns to the lender for approval, although "[i]t did not
examine the foundation plans and did not make any recommenda-
tions as to the design or construction of the houses." 50 The lender
did suggest that the developer increase sales prices, and the devel-
oper followed this advice.51 As the work proceeded, the lender peri-
odically inspected the construction site to ensure that the devel-
oper followed the submitted plans and that the developer spent
construction money only for the intended purposes. 52 The lender,
however, did not perform any of the actual construction work.5
47. See id. at -, 447 P.2d at 621, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 381. This was the first time that a
court addressed the issue of lender liability to home buyers for construction defects. Gutier-
rez, Liability of a Construction Lender Under Civil Code Section 3434: An Amorphous
Epitaph to Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association, 8 PAc. L.J. 1, 1 (1977).
Apparently, the California legislature disapproved of the court's handling of the lender lia-
bility issue. In 1969, the legislature enacted the following statute:
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of which are used or may be
used by the borrower to finance the design, manufacture, construction, repair,
modification or improvement of real or personal property for sale or lease to
others, shall not be liable to third persons for any loss or damage occasioned by
any defect in the real or personal property so designed, manufactured, con-
structed, repaired, modified or improved or for any loss or damage resulting
from the failure of the borrower to use due care in the design, manufacture,
construction, repair, modification or improvement of such real or personal
property, unless such loss or damage is a result of an act of the lender outside
the scope of the activities of a lender of money or unless the lender has been a
party to misrepresentation with respect to such real or personal property.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3434 (West 1970). For an interesting discussion of Great Western and the
judicial and legislative responses to the decision, see Gutierrez, supra; Comment, A New
Tenant Remedy: Lender Liability for Structural Defects, 3 U.C.D. L. REv. 167 (1971).
48. 69 Cal. 2d at __, 447 P.2d at 612-14, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 372-74.
49. Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 614, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
50. Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 613-14, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
51. Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 614, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
52. See id. at -, 447 P.2d at 615, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 375. In fact, the lender wanted to be
certain that the builder disbursed construction money only for completed work. Id.
53. See id. at -, 447 P.2d at 611, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
SPECIAL DECLARANT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
Two years after completion of the development, expansion and
contraction of the adobe soil severely damaged the foundations of
houses in the development.54 Homeowners in the development
sued both the lender and the developer, asserting two theories of
liability. They argued that the lender was a partner of the devel-
oper in a joint venture and, as such, was vicariously liable for the
developer's negligence.5 5 The homeowners also argued that the
lender had breached an independent duty to use reasonable care to
prevent major defects.56
Although the California Supreme Court did not find a joint ven-
ture,5 7 the court imposed liability on the lender because the lender
owed an independent "duty to the buyers of the homes to exercise
reasonable care to protect them from damages caused by major
structural defects."58 The court considered several factors in reach-
ing this conclusion:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of pol-
icy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which
are [1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to af-
fect the plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the de-
fendant's conduct, and [6] the policy of preventing future
harm.59
After examining these factors, the court concluded that Great
Western intended that its transactions affect the home buyers sig-
nificantly,60 that Great Western knew or should have known of the
risk of harm to the home buyers,61 and that the home buyers unde-
niably suffered injury. 2 Moreover, the court decided that Great
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at , 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
58. Id. at - , 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
59. Id. (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958)).
60. 69 Cal. 2d at - , 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
61. Id.
62. Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 617-18, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78.
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Western's conduct was connected closely with the injury suffered
by the home buyers, that substantial moral blame attached to
Great Western's conduct, and that the admonitory policy of tort
law required imposing liability for negligence on Great Western."3
The California court dismissed concerns about imposing liability
on the lender by reasoning that "[i]f reliable construction is the
norm, the recognition of a duty on the part of tract financiers to
home buyers should not materially increase the cost of housing or
drive small builders out of business. '6 4 The majority, however, did
not address adequately the effect that lender liability would have
on lending practices.
The dissent argued that imposing liability on the lender could
have an extensive impact on lending practices, the housing market,
and the economy. 5 The dissent feared that imposing liability
might discourage lenders from making construction loans, thereby
destroying the housing and construction industries. Alternatively,
the additional liability might cause construction lenders to raise
interest rates to unaffordable levels, or to levels that would in-
crease significantly construction costs for new homes."6
Although some courts have adopted the Great Western rule,
most courts have not imposed liability for negligent construction
on lenders who have foreclosed on condominium developments.8
Several courts have refused to impose liability because the lender's
only involvement with the development has been financial.68 The
63. Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
64. Id.
65. Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 622, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk
argued that
[b]y imposing the entrepreneur's risks upon the supplier of capital, even
though the latter has bargained away the opportunity of participating in the
entrepreneurial gain on his capital by lending it at a fixed fee, the majority
have effected a drastic restructuring of traditional economic relationships. The
results may reverberate throughout the economy of our state, and may seri-
ously affect the money and investment market, the construction industry, and
regulatory schemes of financial institutions, all without the faintest hint in ei-
ther statutory or case authority that such a draconian result is compelled.
Id. He further noted that liability for negligence could not be imposed if no duty of care
existed, and that this duty did not exist in the lender-borrower relationship. Id.
66. Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 625, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
67. See infra notes 69-94 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Roose, 348 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
1000 Grandview Ass'n v. Mt. Washington Assocs., 290 Pa. Super. 365, 434 A.2d 796 (1981).
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decisions do not preclude the possibility that these courts would
impose liability in future cases, however, if the lender is involved
closely with the developer before or after foreclosure. Rather than
requiring courts to impose liability on an ad hoc basis, legislatures
should establish statutory guidelines that enable unit purchasers
and lenders to determine the effects of a potential foreclosure.
Judicial Approaches to Condominium Mortgage Foreclosures
Courts in jurisdictions without applicable statutes have strug-
gled with the conflicting policy goals of protecting buyers' expec-
tancy interests and lenders' security interests. As a result, these
jurisdictions have not developed a consistent approach for allocat-
ing special declarant rights and obligations following mortgage
foreclosures on condominium developments. A series of cases de-
cided. by the Florida District Courts of Appeal illustrates the diffi-
culties encountered by the courts.
In First Wisconsin National Bank v. Roose, 9 the Florida Court
of Appeal for the Fourth District held that no greater duty could
be imposed on the construction lender than it had assumed as a
lender and security holder.7 0 The developer, in selling units in a
recreational condominium complex, had promised buyers that it
would maintain the recreational areas. 1 Following the sale of the
units to individual purchasers, the developer became insolvent and
failed to provide the promised maintenance. 2 In the event of a
foreclosure, the construction lender would have had an interest in
maintaining the recreational areas. The lender did not foreclose on
the development, however, and did not maintain the recreational
areas. When the recreational areas began to deteriorate, the unit
owners sued to force the lender to provide maintenance funds or to
foreclose on the development."
Based on the financing arrangement, the unit owners sought to
establish a joint-venture relationship between the developer and
the lender so that the court might hold the lender liable for failing
69. 348 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
70. See id. at 611.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
1984]
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to maintain the recreational areas.7 4 Alternatively, the owners re-
quested that the court impose a duty on the lender to use reasona-
ble care in supervising the construction work and in maintaining
the recreational areas.75 The court refused to impose liability on
the lender on a joint-venture basis because the community of in-
terest necessary to create a joint-venture relationship did not ex-
ist.76 In contrast to the California court's decision in Great West-
ern, the Florida court also rejected the unit owners' claim that the
lender owed a duty to use reasonable care to supervise the devel-
oper.77 Thus, the court found no legal or logical basis for ordering
the lender to foreclose, and denied the requested relief.
78
Three years later, in Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors,7e the
Florida Court of Appeal for the Second District did impose liabil-
ity on a foreclosing lender for construction defects. In Chotka, the
developer had completed most of the complex before defaulting on
the construction loan.80 The lender foreclosed, completed the rec-
reational areas and lobbies, and finished individual units as the
unit purchasers requested."' The lender, however, did not perform
any major construction work. 2 The unit owners sued the lender,
requesting damages for defects and omissions in the original con-
struction of the condominium and common elements.83 The lender
denied any knowledge of construction or design defects at the time
of foreclosure, and denied that it was liable as a developer of the
project.8 4
Looking beyond the lender's characterization of itself as merely
a construction money lender, the court reasoned that the defend-
ant became more than a lender when it took title to the condomin-
74. Id.
75. Id. The plaintiffs' arguments were identical to the arguments raised in
Great Western. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
76. 348 So. 2d at 611.
77. Id. The court noted that the owners did not allege sufficient facts to establish any
duty of supervision on the part of the lender. Id.
78. Id.
79. 383 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
80. Id. at 1170. According to the court, "the project had been completed except for the
swimming pool, tennis court, lobby, game room, elevator lobbies, and two sauna baths." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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ium project and completed construction. At that point, the lender
held itself out as the developer by advertising and selling units in
the project.85 The court held that the lender became a developer
"to the extent that [it] may be held liable for performance of ex-
press representations made to the buyer, for patent construction
defects in the entire condominium project and for any breach of
any applicable warranties due to defects in the portions of the pro-
ject [it] completed. ... 8'Adopting reasoning similar to the anal-
ysis in Great Western, the court decided that if a construction
lender becomes involved with a condominium development other
than as a mere lender and security holder, the lender becomes lia-
ble for the results of its own acts and promises and for the obvious
or discoverable construction defects caused by the original
developer.
In a more recent case, the Florida Court of Appeal for the Third
District refused to impose liability on a construction lender. In
Riverview Condominium Corp. v. Campagna Construction Co.,87
the developer had promised to repair a defective roof on a condo-
minium if the lender would postpone foreclosure actions.8 When
the developer did not make the promised repairs, the unit owners
sued the developer on a variety of theories, and also sued the
lender, claiming third-party beneficiary status under the contract
between the developer and the lender.8 9 The court dismissed the
claim against the lender, noting that a third party could not sue
the promisee of a contract for damages after the promisor
breached the contract.90 The court implied, however, that the ben-
eficiaries of the agreement could bring third-party claims against
the developer."'
The unit owners in Riverview, unlike those in Roose, Chotka,
and Great Western, did not argue that the lender's involvement in
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 406 So. 2d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
88. Id. at 102.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. The unit owners already had a cause of action against the developer because
the developer owed the unit owners a duty to repair improperly constructed facilities. Thus,
a third-party beneficiary claim against the developer would not provide the unit owners
with any additional relief.
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the project made it independently liable as a developer. If the own-
ers had made this argument, the court might have found that the
lender had become a developer of the project by requiring the de-
veloper to engage in particular construction practices, thus making
the lender liable for the developer's obligations. Another factor dis-
tinguishing both Riverview and Roose from Chotka was the ab-
sence of foreclosure proceedings. Only in Chotka had the lender
foreclosed on the development.
The most important factor in the Florida cases, however, was the
degree of the lender's involvement in the project. In this respect,
the decisions are similar to Great Western. The more extensive the
lender's involvement in the development, the higher the
probability that it will be liable for construction flaws and other
problems involving the condominium development. The courts
have failed to state clearly, however, the extent of the involvement
necessary to trigger the lender's liability.
A survey of cases in other jurisdictions does not clarify the
threshold at which the lender's involvement gives rise to liability.
In 1000 Grandview Association v. Mt. Washington Associates,92
for example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court dismissed without
explanation the complaint of a unit owners' association. The com-
plaint alleged that the lender was a joint venturer liable as a devel-
oper for construction defects and, alternatively, that the lender
had failed to use reasonable care in supervising construction and
was therefore liable for the resulting damage. The court stated that
''a mere lender of construction money" could not be liable for the
quality of construction,9" but the court did not indicate the types
of activity that might give rise to liability.9 4
92. 290 Pa. Super. 365, -, 434 A.2d 796, 797 (1981).
93. Id. at -, 434 A.2d at 798.
94. Recently, a court in the District of Columbia ordered a lender who merely had fore-
closed on a development to prepare new condominium documents and to provide security
and maintenance for the development. See Teeley, supra note 1, at E20, col. 3. Before fore-
closure, only one person had purchased a unit and moved into the complex. Id. The lender
refused to perform the promises that the developer made to the sole unit owner, and the
owner sued to have the promises enforced. Id. Although the unit owner filed a motion for a
new trial, the trial court indicated that the unit owner should address most of her claims to
the developer rather than to the lender. Id. This resolution left the owner without a remedy,
however, because the developer had no funds with which to pay damages. See id.
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Special Declarant Rights
The previous discussion has focused on the lender's special de-
clarant obligations and liabilities upon the insolvency of the devel-
oper or foreclosure by the lender. Confusion concerning the
lender's exercise of special declarant rights also may arise under
these circumstances. The foreclosing lender may be uncertain
about its right to complete the project and about the liabilities
that it may incur by acting or failing to act. The lender may wish
to maintain, sell, or continue development of the project, or change
the development from a condominium complex to an apartment
complex. Additionally, the lender may be uncertain about its right
to manage, advertise, and sell units in the project, maintain offices
in the complex, and use the common areas. Only a clear statutory
delineation of the rights and obligations of a foreclosing lender will
alleviate these uncertainties.
THE STATUTORY RESPONSE
In response to the problems of transferring special declarant
rights and obligations from condominium developers to foreclosing
construction lenders, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws developed section 3-104 of the Uniform
Condominium Act.95 Six states have adopted section 3-104 without
significant changes.9 6 Oregon and Michigan have adopted alterna-
tive statutes that also respond to the problem of transferring spe-
cial declarant rights and obligations.9
The Uniform Condominium Act Approach
The Uniform Condominium Act does not affect the developer's
liability for contract and warranty obligations. Section 3-104 places
liability for the breach of any warranties, as well as for any con-
struction problems arising before transfer or foreclosure, on the de-
veloper.9 8 Additionally, the developer. remains liable for the subse-
95. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 1370.
96. See supra note 14.
97. See supra note 15.
98. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-104(b)(1). "Upon transfer of any special declarant right,
the liability of a transferor declarant is as follows: (1) A transferor is not relieved of any
obligation or liability arising before the transfer and remains liable for warranty obligations
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quent declarant obligations and liabilities of the successor if the
transferee or foreclosing lender is an affiliate of the developer."9
Any entity that controls or is controlled by the developer, or that
exercises joint control with the developer over the condominium
project is an affiliate.100 Presumably, a lender would be an affiliate
if it became closely involved in the project, as the lenders did in
Great Western and Chotka. Even if the developer and its succes-
sor are not affiliated, the developer is responsible for subsequent
obligations arising from any special declarant rights that the devel-
oper might have retained.10 1 If the developer is not affiliated with
the lender and the developer has not retained any special declarant
rights, however, the developer is not responsible for any problems
arising after a foreclosure or transfer that terminates its interest in
the project. 02
Under section 3-104, the lender, unlike the developer, may
choose the special declarant rights that it wishes to acquire and
thereby determine the extent of its liability to condominium own-
ers. 03 The foreclosing lender has three alternatives: the lender may
succeed to all special declarant rights,0 4 thus assuming all obliga-
tions associated with the possession or exercise of those rights; 05
the lender may succeed only to certain special declarant rights re-
lated to maintaining models, sales offices, and signs, 10 thus limit-
imposed upon him by this Act." Id.
99. Id. § 3-104(b)(2). "If a successor to any special declarant right is an affiliate of a
declarant ... the transferor is jointly and severally liable with the successor for any obliga-
tions or liabilities of the successor relating to the condominium." Id.
100. Id. § 1-103(1).
101. Id. § 3-104(b)(3). "If a transferor retains any special declarant right ... the trans-
feror is liable for any obligations or liabilities . . . relating to the retained special declarant
rights and arising after the transfer." Id.
102. Id. § 3-104(b)(4). "A transferor has no liability for any act or omission or any breach
of a contractual or warranty obligation arising from the exercise of a special declarant right
by a successor declarant who is not an affiliate of the transferor." Id.
103. Id. § 3-104(c). The last sentence of this section provides that "[tihe judgment or
instrument conveying title [following foreclosure] shall provide for transfer of only the spe-
cial declarant rights requested." Id.
104. Id. § 3-104(c). "[A] person acquiring title to all the real estate being foreclosed...
upon his request, succeeds to all special declarant rights related to that real estate. .. " Id.
105. See id. § 3-104(e)(2)(ii).
106. Id. § 3-104(c). "[A] person acquiring title to all the real estate being foreclosed or
sold, but only upon his request, succeeds. . . only to any rights reserved in the declaration
... to maintain models, sales offices and signs." Id.
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ing its liability; or the lender may succeed to all special declarant
rights, but declare that it holds those rights solely for transfer to
another. 10 7 The third option minimizes the lender's exposure to lia-
bility.108 None of these options exposes the lender to liability for
the developer's declarant obligations unless the lender assumes the
obligations'09 or is an affiliate of the developer."'
A lender that succeeds to all special declarant rights is exposed
to a broad range of potential liability. Essentially, the lender be-
comes liable to unit owners for everything except the developer's
misrepresentations, breaches of warranty, breaches of fiduciary
duty, and obligations resulting from the developer's acts after the
transfer."' Although the risk of liability is greater under this op-
tion, the lender acquires the right to complete construction, ex-
pand or contract the project, sell units, and control the homeown-
ers association." 2 This alternative may appeal to a lender who has
foreclosed on a substantially completed project, because the lender
may finish construction, quickly sell the units, and recover a large
portion of its investment. For example, if only four units and the
recreational areas remained unfinished in a large condominium de-
107. Id. § 3-104(e)(4). "A successor to all special declarant rights ... may declare his
intention in a recorded instrument to hold those rights solely for transfer to another per-
son." Id.
108. This provision is designed to deal with the typical problem of a foreclosing
mortgage lender who opts to bid in and obtain the project at the foreclosure
sale solely for the purpose of subsequent resale. It permits such a foreclosing
lender to undertake such a transaction without incurring the full burden of
declarant obligations and liabilities.
Id. comment 7.
109. Id. § 3-104(c). The lender may assume the developer's declarant obligations in order
to maintain good relations with the unit owners or to strengthen his ability to complete the
development. See Teeley, supra note 1, at E21, col. 3.
110. UN'. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-104(e)(1). "A successor to any special declarant right
who is an affiliate of a declarant is subject to all obligations and liabilities imposed on the
transferor by this Act or by the declaration." Id.
111. A successor ... is subject to all obligations and liabilities imposed ... (ii) on
his transferor, other than: (A) misrepresentations by any previous declarant;
(B) warranty obligations on improvements made by any previous declarant, or
made before the condominium was created; (C) breach of any fiduciary obliga-
tion by any previous declarant or his appointees to the executive board; or (D)
any liability or obligation imposed on the transferor as a result of the trans-
feror's acts or omissions after the transfer.
Id. § 3-104(e)(2)(ii).
112. Id. §§ 1-103(23), 3-104(c).
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velopment at the time of foreclosure, the lender probably would
elect the first alternative so that it could sell the finished units and
complete the other units and recreational areas. Before requesting
to succeed to all special declarant rights, however, the lender
would want to verify that the original developer did not make any
serious construction errors for which the lender might be held
liable.
If the complex is complete, the second alternative would be more
attractive to the foreclosing lender. This alternative allows the
lender to maintain models, sales offices, and signs on the common
elements, and to advertise and sell individual units. The lender's
only potential liability would be for failure to issue a public offer-
ing statement. 113 Because a lender can avoid liability by simply
filing the required papers,11' the lender can eliminate virtually all
liability. Thus, if the lender can sell the condominium units with-
out additional construction, the lender should choose the second
option.
The third alternative, involving succession to all special declar-
ant rights solely for transfer to another, is attractive to lenders
who have foreclosed on uncompleted condominium developments
or on projects that have serious construction or design flaws. If the
lender chooses this alternative, the only special declarant right
that it can exercise is control over the condominium homeowners
association.11 5 The third option insulates the lender from any lia-
bility to the unit owners except for the liability that may arise
113. Id. § 3-104(e)(3). "A successor to only a right reserved in the declaration to maintain
models, sales offices, and signs. . . is not subject to any liability or obligation as a declarant,
except the obligation to provide a public offering statement. .. ." Id.
114. Of course, if the lender makes misrepresentations in the public offering statement, it
may be held liable to unit owners on contractual grounds or for securities fraud. In addition,
the lender may be subject to other civil and criminal liability for violations of the securities
laws. See generally M. LEviNE, supra note 36; J. MORRIS, How SECURITIs LAWS AFFECT
REAL ESTATE OFFERINGS 15-18, 34-36 (Real Est. Rev. Portfolios No. 12, 1977).
115. Thereafter, until transferring all special declarant rights to any person acquir-
ing title to any unit owned by the successor, or until recording an instrument
permitting exercise of all those rights, that successor may not exercise any of
those rights other than any right held by his transferor to control the executive
board in accordance with the provisions of section 2-102(d) for the duration of
any period of declarant control, and any attempted exercise of those rights is
void.
UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-104(e)(4).
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from his own acts and omissions in controlling the association. 1 ' If
the lender merely holds the property until another developer as-
sumes control, the lender will not be liable to unit owners for any
contract or warranty obligations, structural defects, or obligations
of either the original developer or the successor developer. 117
The Commissioners designed section 3-104 to balance the inter-
ests of lenders and unit owners. 18 Section 3-104 preserves the unit
owner's right to proceed against the original developer for struc-
tural defects, misrepresentations, breaches of warranty, and
breaches of fiduciary duty." 9 This right probably will be worthless
to many owners, however, because the developer usually is insol-
vent after a foreclosure. To resolve this problem, section 3-104 cod-
ifies the Great Western rule by imposing liability on lenders that
become involved with the development before or after foreclosure,
but negates liability if the lender merely loans money or acquires a
security interest. Thus, a lender who has become an affiliate of the
developer before foreclosure, or who elects to succeed to all of the
developer's special declarant rights may be liable to unit owners
for a variety of damages. If the lender does not elect to succeed to
all of the developer's special declarant rights, however, the extent
116. Id. §§ 3-104(e)(4), 3-103(d).
117. See id.
118. Id. § 3-104 comment 2. The Commissioners indicated that
section [3-104] strikes a balance between the obvious need to protect the inter-
ests of unit owners and the equally important need to protect innocent succes-
sors to a declarant's rights, especially persons such as mortgagees whose only
interest in the condominium project is to protect their debt security. The gen-
eral scheme of the section is to impose upon a declarant continuing obligations
and liabilities for promises, acts, or omissions undertaken during the period
that he was in contol of the condominium, while relieving a declarant who
transfers all or part of his special declarant rights in a project of such responsi-
bilities with respect to the promises, acts, or omissions of a successor over
whom he has no control. Similarly, the section imposes obligations and liabili-
ties arising after the transfer upon a non-affiliated successor to a declarant's
interests, but absolves such a transferee of responsibility for the promises, acts,
or omissions of a transferor declarant over which he had no control. Finally,
the section makes special provision for the interests of certain successor declar-
ants (e.g., a mortgagee who succeeds to the rights of the declarant pursuant to
a "deed in lieu of foreclosure" and who holds the project solely for transfer to
another person) by relieving such persons of virtually all of the obligations and
liabilities imposed upon declarants by this Act.
Id.
119. See id. § 3-104(b)(1), (3).
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of the lender's potential liability is significantly curtailed and the
injured unit owner may be left without a meaningful remedy.
The Oregon Approach
The Oregon statute 2° is similar to section 3-104 in many re-
spects, but it exposes the lender to a broader range of potential
liability. The statute imposes liability on the developer for any de-
clarant obligations arising before the foreclosure and for any
breach of warranty.1 21 Additionally, if the developer retains special
declarant rights or is affiliated with the lender, the developer be-
comes jointly and severally liable for all obligations and liabilities
of the lender.1 22 If the developer does not retain any rights after
foreclosure and is not affiliated with the lender, however, the de-
veloper will not be liable for the lender's contractual or warranty
obligations.1
23
A developer's successor is similarly liable for all the obligations
of the developer, except for misrepresentations, breaches of war-
ranty, and breaches of fiduciary duty.124 If the lender and devel-
oper are affiliates, however, the lender will be liable for all the de-
120. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 94.097, 94.103 (1981).
121. Upon the transfer of any special declarant right, the liabilities and obligations
of a transferor are as follows: (a) A transferor is not relieved of any obligation
or liability arising before the transfer and remains liable for warranty obliga-
tions imposed under ORS 94.017. Lack of privity does not deprive any unit
owner of standing to bring an action to enforce any obligation of the transferor.
Id. § 94.097(2).
122. (b) If a transferor retains any special declarant right, or if a successor declar-
ant is an affiliate of the transferor, the transferor is subject to liability for all
obligations and liabilities imposed on a declarant by the provisions of ORS
94.004 to 94.480 and 94.991 or by the declaration or bylaws arising after the
transfer and is jointly and severally liable with the successor declarant for the
liabilities and obligations of the successor declarant which relate to the
condominium.
Id. at § 94.097(2)(b).
123. "(c) A transferor who retains no special declarant right has no liability for any act or
omission or any breach of a contractual or warranty obligation arising from the exercise of a
special declarant right by a successor declarant who is not an affiliate of the transferor." Id.
§ 94.097(2)(c).
124. A successor declarant who is not an affiliate of the transferor is subject to all
obligations and liabilities imposed upon a declarant. . . except for liability for
misrepresentations or warranties made by the declarant or previous successor
declarant or for a breach of fiduciary obligation by such person.
Id. § 94.097(3)(b).
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veloper's obligations, including liability for misrepresentations and
breaches of warranty or fiduciary duty.125 The Oregon statute de-
fines an affiliate as anyone who "has contributed more than twenty
percent of the capital of the [developer]. ' 126 Generally, construc-
tion lenders provide far more than twenty percent of the capital
for a condominium project, and thus would be considered affiliates
exposed to the same liability as the developer.
The Michigan Approach
Michigan has adopted an entirely different approach to the
problem of delegating special declarant rights and obligations. The
Michigan statute provides that the "obligations of the developer to
condominium unit purchasers . . . shall not be affected by the
transfer of the developer's interest in the condominium project,"
and that the mortgagee "shall not be required to assume and shall
not otherwise be liable for any contractual obligations of its prede-
cessor in title.' 127 The developer remains fully liable after foreclo-
sure, but the lender is immune from liability.
As a corollary, the statute restricts at least one of the special
declarant rights that the lender may exercise.1 28 After foreclosure,
the lender may have to file disclosure documents and must obtain
permission from the Michigan Department of Commerce before
selling any condominium units.1 29 These restrictions prevent the
lender from defrauding potential buyers. 130 Although this statute
appears to protect a lender from liability for the developer's obli-
gations, restricting the lender's ability to sell the remaining units
125. See id. § 94.097(3)(a).
126. Id. § 94.097(l)(d).
127. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 559.235, 559.237 (Supp. 1982).
128. A mortgagee ... which acquires title to the lesser of 10 units or 75 percent of
the units in the condominium project, by foreclosure, deed in lieu of foreclo-
sure or similar transaction, shall obtain a permit to sell from the [Department
of Commerce] administrator prior to selling any such units. The administrator
may condition the issuance of a permit to sell upon compliance by such mort-
gagee . . . with the provisions of ... this act, [relating to disclosure state-
ments] and any other provisions of the act as may be required by rule in order
to insure that the condominium project will not work or tend to work a fraud
or deception on prospective co-owners.
Id. § 559.235.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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may discourage lenders from funding condominium projects.
Although the foreclosing lender may be concerned by the imped-
iments to selling remaining units, its position is vastly superior to
the preforeclosure unit owner. The Michigan statute provides al-
most complete protection for the foreclosing lender, while leaving
the unit owner without a meaningful remedy. Under the statute,
the developer remains solely liable after foreclosure. The unit own-
er seeking judicial redress can sue only the developer, who is prob-
ably insolvent.
Evaluating the Statutory Approaches
Of the three statutory approaches, section 3-104 of the Uniform
Condominium Act strikes the fairest balance between the interests
of lenders and the interests of condominium unit owners. Under
section 3-104, the lender may control the extent of its liability. De-
pending on the rights exercised by the lender, its liability may be
nonexistent, limited, or complete. Section 3-104 does not guarantee
that the unit owner will recover from the lender for the developer's
acts or omissions, but it preserves the possibility. Indeed, the own-
er's chance of recovering from the lender is good if the lender has
finished the development and sold some of the units. If the lender
has not become involved in the completion of the development,
imposing liability on the lender for the developer's acts would be
inequitable. The policy of imposing liability on the foreclosing
lender based upon the extent of the lender's involvement with the
development is preferable to an all-or-nothing approach. Section 3-
104 allocates loss between lenders and unit owners on the basis of
the preferable policy.
In contrast, Oregon and Michigan have taken a one-sided ap-
proach. The Oregon statute exposes the lender to full liability for
the obligations of the developer, although the lender may have
done nothing more than provide funds for the development. This
approach probably will discourage lenders from making construc-
tion loans for condominium projects. Lenders are not likely to
finance condominium developments if the loans involve a greater
risk of liability than a secured lender would assume in any other
situation. The Oregon statute, however, ensures that injured con-
dominium unit owners will recover for any deficiencies in the con-
dominium or for any breach of warranty. Thus, if lenders finance a
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condominium development in Oregon, unit owners always should
recover their losses even if a developer defaults on the construction
loan.
Michigan, on the other hand, protects lenders completely and
leaves unit owners without a remedy upon the developer's insol-
vency or bankruptcy. Although lenders deserve some protection
from liability for a developer's breach of warranty or negligence,
providing full protection may be unfair to unit owners. If the
lender becomes involved in the development, it should be liable for
its own negligence and for its own contractual obligations. Other-
wise, lenders will have little incentive to act responsibly in approv-
ing or supervising construction plans." 1
The Oregon and Michigan statutes are extreme approaches to
the problem of equitably allocating losses from failed condomin-
ium developments. Both lenders and unit owners want and deserve
protection, but both interests cannot be accommodated fully. Sec-
tion 3-104 of the Uniform Condominium Act varies the protection
according to the lender's activities and equitably allocates liability
between the parties.
CONCLUSION
Delegating special declarant rights and obligations equitably fol-
lowing mortgage foreclosures on condominium developments in-
volves allocating a loss between two innocent parties. Because the
problem has no easy solution, and because judicial decisions have
not demonstrated a consistent approach, a statutory delegation of
rights and obligations is desirable. Section 3-104 of the Uniform
Condominium Act does not apportion the loss in all circumstances;
the Act preserves the possibility that either the lender or the unit
131. Of course, lenders will want to protect the value of their security interests. In Connor
v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968), the
court recognized a duty on the part of the lender to protect the value of a project for which
it had providing funding:
Since the value of the security for the construction loans and thereafter the
security for the permanent financing loans depended on the construction of
sound homes, Great Western was clearly under a duty of care to its sharehold-
ers to exercise its powers of control over the enterprise to prevent the construc-
tion of defective homes.
Id. at _, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376. The beneficiaries of this duty, however, are
not condominium buyers, but shareholders of the lender.
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owner will bear the entire loss generated by an insolvent developer.
Section 3-104, however, allocates the loss between the innocent
parties if the lender exercises certain special declarant rights or as-
sumes certain obligations. In contrast, the Oregon and Michigan
statutes fail to allocate the loss on the basis of the lender's involve-
ment in the project. Of the three statutory approaches, section 3-
104 strikes the fairest balance between the interests of unit owners
and the interests of lenders. In jurisdictions without similar statu-
tory guidelines, the courts should seek to effectuate the policy con-
siderations underlying section 3-104.
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